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GERTRUDE ELSBETH MUELLER, Respondent, v. KURT 
HANS MUELLER, AppellantI' 
[1] Divoree-Evidenee.-Evidence that husband frequently cursed 
wife, broke dishes, brandished poker over her and one of chil-
dren, threw radio out of house when her playing it disturbed 
him and on at least two occasions beat her; that she was afraid 
of him, that her mental health was seriously impaired, that 
on one occasion she returned home to find that he had taken 
pills and was unconscious on floor, and that she admitted 
committing adultery with two men, together with evidence that 
both parties made unsuccessful attempts to reconcile their 
differences, justified trial court in concluding that legitimate 
objects of marriage had been destroyed, that its continuation 
was seriously impairing wife's health and threatened husband's 
health, that it involved atmosphere of bitterness and hatred 
in home that was deleterious to interests of children, and 
that marriage should be- terminated. 
[2] Id.-Recrimination.-When each of parties has given the other 
grounds for divorce, court may grant divorce to both, and 
it is clothed with broad discretion to advance requireru,.ents 
of justice in each partiCUlar case. 
HeX. Dig. References: [1) Divol'ce~ § 101; [2~ 3) Divorce, § 60; 
[4-8] Divorce, § 198. 
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[3] Id.-Recrimination.-Comparative guilt of parties to divorce 
action may have important bearing on whether or not either 
one or both should be granted relief. 
[4] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-When divorce is granted to both 
.parties, alimony may be awarded to either, since basis of lia-
bility for alimony is granting of divorce against person re-
quired to pay it. (Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Adultery of wife does not compel 
trial court to deny her alimony when both parties have been 
guilty of marital fault. 
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Facts that legitimate objects of 
matrimony have been destroyed and that no purpose would be 
served by maintaining marriage do not, standing alone, pro-
vide basis for allowing husband to escape obligation of sup-
port he assumed and which he would be compelled to discharge 
if divorce were denied. 
[7] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-Comparative guilt of parties is only 
one of considerations that are important in determining 
whether alimony should be granted. 
[8] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-In any particular case adultery 
mayor may not constitute greater fault than that of other 
party, and where it cannot be said as matter of law that wife's 
infidelities occurring over period of three months approxi-
mately two years before her divorce action was filed were 
necessarily more outrageous than husband's course of con-
tinuous cruel conduct toward her that involved physical at-
tacks and beatings and seriously endangered her health, and 
where she had been married to him for 16 years prior to 
institution of action, was mother of three children who needed 
her care, and her health was impaired to such extent that her 
earning capacity was problematical for immediate future, trial 
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to deny her alimony 
on ground of her own marital fault. 
APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County. Jerold E. Weil, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for divorce, and cross-complaint for similar relief. 
Judgment awarding divorce to both parties affirmed. 
[3] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce 
cases, note, 170 A.L.R. 1076. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and 
Separation, § 61; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 233. 
[4] Allowance of permanent alimony to wife against whom 
divorce is graItted, note, 34 A.L.R.2d 313. See also Cal.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, § 201 et seq.; Am.Jur., Divorce and 
Separation, § 586 et seq. 
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Krag & Sweet and William L. Mock for Appellant. 
Dockweiler & Dockweiler and Frederick C. Dockweiler for 
Respondent. 
TRA YNOR J.-On September 30, 1952, plaintiff Gertrude 
Mueller tiled this action for divorce against defendant Kurt 
Mueller alleging extreme cruelty. Defendant cross-com-
plained for divorce alleging extreme cruelty and adultery. 
The parties were married in 1936 and have three children who 
were 15, 12, and 9 years of age at the time of the trial. Plain-
tiff testified that it had been a bad marriage and that she had 
wanted a divorce when she was first pregnant. Defendant 
frequently cursed plaintiff and broke dishes and on one oc-
casion he brandished a poker over her and one of the children 
and then dashed it into the fireplace. He threw a radio out 
of the house when plaintiff's playing it disturbed him, and on 
at least two occasions he beat her. She was afraid of him. and 
her mental health has been seriously impaired. On one oc-
casion when she left the house in fear, he threatened to break 
everything in the place if she did not return at once, and 
when she returned she found that he had taken pills and was 
unconscious on the floor. She admitted-eommitting adultery 
with two men in August, September, and October of 1950 and 
testified that she had told her husband about these incidents 
and that they had continued regular sexual relations there-
after. Defendant denied much of the foregoing testimony, 
but he admitted that he had beaten plaintiff on one oecasion. 
He also testified that she made unfounded accusations of in-
fidelity against him. Both parties made attempts to reconcile 
their difficulties but to no avail. On the basis of the fore-
going evidence and other evidence, much of which was cor-
roborated by other witnesses, the trial court found that each 
of the parties had treated the other with extreme cruelty 
and that plaintiff had committed adultery. It also found that 
both of the parties were fit and proper persons to have 
custody of the children and ~hat it was for their best in-
terests that their custody be awarded to plaintiff. Judgment 
was entered granting each of the parties an interlocutory 
decree of divorce against the other, awarding custody of the 
children to plaintiff, dividing the community property, and 
awarding plaintiff $200 per month alimony and $210 per 
month for the support of the children. Defendant appeals 
from the entire judgment except that part thereof granting 
him an interlocutor l' decree of divorce from plainti1L 
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing 
to find that his cause of action for divorce was in bar of 
plaintiff's cause of action (see Civ. Code, § 122), and in 
awarding alimony to a wife found guilty of adultery. We 
can~ot agree with these contentions. 
[1] The trial court was justified in concluding that the 
legitimate objects of the marriage had been destroyed, that 
its continuation was seriously impairing plaintiff's health 
and threatening defendant's health, and that it involved an 
atmosphere of bitterness and hatred in the home that was 
clearly deleterious to the interests of the children. Accord-
ingly, it did not err in determining that the marriage should 
be terminated. (De Bttrgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 872-
873 [250 P.2d 598]; Phillips v. Phillips, 41 Ca1.2d 869, 
876-877 [264 P.2d 926].) It remains to be determined, how-
ever, whether it erred in granting a divorce to both of the 
parties and awarding alimony to plaintiff. 
[2] When each of the parties has given the other grounds 
tor divorce, the court may grant a divorce to both, and it 
"is clothed with a broad discretion to advance the require-
ments of justice in each particular case." [3, 4] The com-
parative guilt of the parties" may have an important bearing 
upon whether or not either one or both should be granted 
relief, " and when "a divorce is granted to both, alimony may 
be awarded to either, for the basis of liability for alimony 
is the granting of a divorce against the person required to pay 
it. (See Civ. Code, § 139.)" (De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 
39 Ca1.2d 858, 872-874; Phillips v. Phillips, supra, 41 Ca1.2d 
869, 877; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 125 Cal.App.2d 239, 242 
[270 P.2d 80].) Although there is authority to the contrary 
(see Phelps v. Phelps, 176 Ky. 456 [195 S.W. 779, 780]; 
Knight v. Knight, 209 Ga. 131 [70 S.E.2d 770, 771] ; 9 A.L.R. 
2d 1026), in the absence of statutory provisions expressly 
prohibiting an award of alimony to a wife guilty of adultery 
(see Borden v. Borden, 156 Fla. 770 [23 So.2d 529]; 34 
A.L.R.2d 313, 349), it has frequently been held in other 
jurisdictions that the wife's adultery does not necessarily 
cause her to forfeit her right to alimony. (Pauly v. Pauly 
14 Okla. 1 [76 P. 148]; Cross v. Cross, 63 N.H. 444, 446; 
Jaffe v. Jaffe, 124 F.2d 233, 234 [74 App.D.C. 394] ; Buer-
fening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563, 564; Graves v. Graves, 
108 Mass. 314, 318; Lunsford v. Lunsford, 232 Ala. 368 [168 
So. 188, 190]; Ashcroft v. Ashcroft [1902] Pl'ob. 270, 277, 
O.A.; Edwards v. Edwards [1894] Probe 33, 38; see also 
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AUdredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504 [229 P.2d 681, 685, 
34 A.L.R.2d 305] ; MacDonald v. MacDonald, -- Utah --
[236 P.2d 1066, 1069] ; Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wash.2d 139 
[260 P.2d 878, 881]; Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799,-r812; 
Larson v. Larson, 2 Ill.2d 451 [118 N.E.2d 433, 434J ; Edwards 
v. Edwards, 222 Ark. 626 [262 S.\V.2d 130, 133].) [5] Al-
though many of these cases arose in jurisdictions that permit 
an award of alimony to a guilty wife even if her husband is 
blameless, the principle they enunciate is even more appli-
cable in a state such as California in which the guilty ~ife 
may receive alimony only if she is granted a divorce against 
a husband who is also guilty of marital fault. They recognize 
that comparative guilt is only one factor in determining 
whether alimony should be awarded and that the needs of the 
wife and the ability of the husband to provide for her are 
also important, and they protect the interest of society in not 
having a wife left destitute. They counsel the wisdom of 
caution before adopting any arbitrary rule that would fetter 
discretion and require the trial court to deny alimony merely 
because the wife has been guilty of adultery. As pointed out 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in dealing with a similar prob-
lem, "Great caution is necessary to prevent the contentions 
and strife which frequently exist in contested divorce cases 
from distorting the judgment by placing extraordinary em-
phasis on particular instances of blameworthy conduct or 
some unusual sacrifice or contribution in some one phase of 
the overall picture." (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, 
236 P.2d 1066, 1069.) "It certainly does not comport with 
good conscience to turn such an unfortunate individual out 
to fend for herself after having given 29 years to this mar-
riage, good or bad as her conduct may have been." (Ibid.) 
••. . . a wife of long standing does not forfeit all right to 
alimony or a share in the property because of recent miscon-
duct nor in cases where the husband may be equally at fault 
nor in cases where there is a doubtful preponderance against 
the wife because judges, being human, cannot penetrate the 
family drama with complete understanding. Perhaps such a 
forfeiture of alimony may not be out of proportion in the 
case where a young wife guilty of acts of moral turpitude, 
has opportunity to start married life anew but in a ca~e such 
as this it would be out of all proportion." (Alldt·edge v . 
. Alldredge, supra, 119 Utah 504 [229 P.2d 681, 685. 34 
A.L.R.2d 305].) 
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Our conclusion that the adultery of the wife does not 
compel the trial court to deny her alimony, when both of the 
parties have been guilty of marital fault finds furthe·r support 
in the cases in which divorces were denied on the ground of 
recrimination. Were we to overrule the De Burgh case, as 
defendant contends we should do, his own fault would pre-
vent granting him the divorce he sought and secured, and 
despite her adultery, his duty to support plaintiff would re-
main. (Mattson v. Mattson, 181 Cal. 44, 48 [183 P. 443]; 
Mohr v. Mohr, 33 Cal.App.2d 274, 276-278 [91 P.2d 238]; 
Goetting v. Goetting, 80 Cal.App. 363, 370 [252 P. 6561; 
Broad v. Broad, 35 Cal.App. 646, 647 [170 P. 658].) [6] The 
fact that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been de-
stroyed and that no purpose is served by maintaining the 
marriage do not, standing alone, provide a basis for allow-
ing defendant to escape the obligation of support he assumed 
and which he would be compelled to discharge if a divorce 
were denied. 
[7] It is true, as the De Burgh case recognized, that the 
comparative guilt of the parties may have an important 
bearing on the relief that is granted. As pointed out above, 
however, it is only one of the considerations that are im-
portant in determining whether alimony should be granted. 
[8] Moreover, in any partiCUlar case adultery mayor may not 
constitute greater fault than that of the other party, and in 
the present case we cannot say as a matter of law that 
plaintiff's infidelities occurring over a period of three months 
approximately two years before the action was filed were 
necessarily more outrageous than defendant's course of con-
tinuous cruel conduct toward plaintiff that involved physical 
attacks and beating~ and seriously endangered her health. 
Plaintiff had been married to defendant for 16 years when 
this action was commenced, she is the mother of three children 
who need her care, and her health has been impaired to such 
an extent that her earning capacity is problematical for the 
immediate future. Under these circumstances the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to deny her alimony 
on the ground of her own marital fault. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concmrred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I adhere to the conclusions which I stated 
in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 874-882 [250 P.2d 
P.98j. B¥ mandata of the Legislature, & divOl'ee ":m.u.a be de-
) 
Died" upon a showing of recrimination. (Civ. Code, § 111.) 
Recrimination is defined as "a showing by the defendant of 
any cause of action against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's 
cause of action." (Civ. Code, § 122.) In my opinion, be-
cause of these statutes there is no legal basis whatever for 
allowing each party to an action for divorce to obtain a decree 
severing the marital relationship_ 
The contrary conclusion reached in the De Burgh case rests 
upon a totally untenable construction of the words "in bar." 
It allows the trial judge to grant a divorce in a situation in 
which, under section 111 of the Civil Code, relief must be de-
nied. To some persons that result may seem to be a desirable 
socia) policy. In my opinion, it amounts to a repeal. by 
judicial decision, of the legislative mandate. 
I would overrule the De Burgh case and the decisions which 
have followed it and reverse the present judgment. 
Shenk, J _, and Spence, J _, concurred. 
